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The Federal Reserve System:
Diversity and Governance1
Kaleb Nygaard2 and Peter Conti-Brown3
Abstract
A growing chorus has called on the Federal Reserve System to diversify its ranks at all levels
to reflect better the heterogeneity of the United States. So far, most of these efforts speak to
the diversity of the Fed’s principals, namely, the members of the Fed’s Board of Governors
and the presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks, who together form the Federal Open
Market Committee. In this study, we look instead at a vital part of Federal Reserve
governance that has so far not received the same sustained attention: the directors of the
Federal Reserve Banks, those private citizens responsible for choosing the presidents of the
Federal Reserve Banks in the first instance and otherwise providing corporate oversight
over the Federal Reserve Banks. We find a staggering homogeneity among them, with only
recent signs of diversification and only then in some parts of those boards. The boards are
overwhelmingly white, overwhelmingly male, and overwhelmingly drawn from the business
communities within their districts, with little participation from minorities, women, or
certain areas of the economy—labor, nonprofits, the academy. We conclude by
recommending that the Federal Reserve System—the Board of Governors, the Federal
Reserve Banks, and the member banks that belong to the system and vote for some of these
directors—make its selection processes more transparent for outside evaluation such that
progress (or lack thereof) can be better measured and attributed.
Keywords: diversity, Federal Reserve, governance
JEL Classifications: G30, M14
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Introduction

The Federal Reserve System has a diversity problem (Corser 2021; GAO 2021). This has long
been obvious at the top of the organization, among the members of the Fed’s Board of
Governors and the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks, who together constitute the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the group that decides the nation’s monetary
policy4 (Klein 2016; Saraiva, Matthews, and Merrill 2020). These key economic
policymakers, among the most important in the nation, are overwhelmingly white and male.
There have been only three Black members of the Fed’s Board of Governors, only one Black
Federal Reserve Bank president, and only three nonwhite Federal Reserve Bank presidents
in the entire system’s history. There is also a sense that these principals are overwhelmingly
promoted from within, creating a risk for groupthink and intellectual homogeneity (ContiBrown, Listokin, and Parrillo 2021; Klein and Weiss 2015). This homogeneity runs deep
within the Federal Reserve System, including at the staff level (Wessel, Sheiner, and Ng
2019).
Less attention, however, has been paid to another extraordinarily important part of the
Federal Reserve System: the directors of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. Since the Fed’s
inception in 1913, the directors were designed to be private sector gatekeepers for the Fed’s
extraordinary power, as a compromise between public and private influence over the
regulation of the nation’s money (Lowenstein 2015). Congress gave these actors the
authority to oversee the Federal Reserve Banks in ways similar to other corporate boards of
directors, with the power to appoint (and remove) the Reserve Bank president and officers,
define the duties of the Bank leadership, and write bylaws by which the Reserve Bank
conducts business. And, as amended, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (FRA) makes clear that
with that power comes the need for great diversity: these directors are to “represent the
public . . . elected without discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, or national
origin, and with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture,
commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers.”5
This provision, added in large part in 1977, is intended to rectify historical exclusions on a
grand scale. This article provides something of a report card on that effort. Using the 106
publicly available annual reports of the Board of Governors from 1914 through 2019, we
compiled a database of all individuals who have served as Federal Reserve Bank directors.
Beyond the basic information found in the annual reports, we expanded the biographical
database to include race, gender, profession, education, age, time spent in position, and
whether or not the director later held a position on the FOMC.

All seven members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Board of New York, and a
rotation of four additional Reserve Bank presidents form the FOMC voting membership, though all Reserve
Bank presidents attend FOMC meetings and participate.
5 12 USC 302.
4
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This biographical database significantly expands, in time horizon and scope of diversity
measures, three important studies completed in the past decade. First, the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank), the financial regulation
reform legislation passed in response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009,
included a provision requiring the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a
review of the governance of the Federal Reserve Banks. Its report, published in October
2011, covers race, gender, education, and industry of directors between 2006 and 2011.
Based on the report’s review, the GAO issued several recommendations aimed at “enhancing
the diversity of the Reserve Bank boards, strengthening policies for managing conflicts of
interest, and enhancing transparency related to board governance” (GAO 2011). The second
study, conducted jointly by Fed Up and the Center for Popular Democracy (CPD), covers race,
gender, and industry between 2013 and 2019, concluding that “the Fed’s pace of change is
entirely too slow” (Corser 2019). Finally, a follow-up study by Fed Up and CPD published in
June 2021 notes that “commendable gains” in diversity have been made for the directors
appointed by the Board of Governors but that the directors elected by local banks to
represent the public “persistently fail on sectoral and racial diversity (Corser 2021). Each of
these studies have made significant contributions to the public dialogue around diversity at
the Fed and include recommendations that the Fed broaden recruitment of directors and
increase transparency of the selection process and governing documents of the directors.
This article, an expansion of our report published by the Brookings Institution in April 2021,
expands the timeline of the above-mentioned databases by (1) filling in data back to the
founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 and (2) expanding the scope of diversity
measures. This allows us to explore the full breadth and history of diversity in this critical
leadership role at the Fed.
The results do not show that the Federal Reserve Bank directors reflect anything close to the
American people along virtually any dimension. On race, we see that the first nonwhite
directors were not appointed by the Board of Governors until the 1970s. Even as late as the
2010s, nonwhite directors represented less than 10% of the total directors in any given year,
as compared to nearly 40% of the total US population (Census 2020). Representation of
female directors tracks a similar pattern, with the first female directors also appointed in the
1970s, reaching 10% by the late 1990s, and increasing more quickly in the 2010s to 37% in
2019. During that period, women represented 50% to 51% of the total US population and
38% to 47% of the workforce (BLS n.d.; World Bank n.d.).
Sectoral representation also suggests important trends that have not been fully understood
or analyzed. First, directors from manufacturing backgrounds decreased as a share of
directors overall from approximately 20% in the 1940s to approximately 5% in the 2010s.
Second, there is a substantial increase in the portion of directors from the nonbank financial
sector from approximately 5% in the 1980s to approximately 10% in the 2010s. These are
directors who are explicitly meant to represent sectors besides finance.
Third, and perhaps most surprising, only 5% of directors have had a PhD in economics—
inarguably an important credential for their main task of evaluating the competence of
central bankers. In general, economists are arguably overrepresented at the Fed’s senior
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ranks, but at the level of Federal Reserve Bank directors, they are substantially
underrepresented, potentially so much so that their central governance purpose becomes
much harder.
Given these failures of diversity, some have argued that, among other reasons, the quasiprivate corporate structure of the Federal Reserve Banks should be jettisoned in favor of the
international standard of a fully public central bank (Haedtler, Levin, and Wilson 2016). We
do not reach that conclusion. Instead, we argue that the system that currently exists, created
by Congress in 1913, can be significantly improved by radically increasing the transparency
around the selection process for Federal Reserve Bank officers and directors (Conti-Brown
2020; Corser 2019; GAO 2011; Nygaard 2020b). More specifically, we urge the Fed—and,
where necessary, Congress—to develop and disclose a more detailed framework through
which Federal Reserve Bank directors are selected. This proposal is not simply an argument
in favor of transparency for transparency’s sake but a recognition that diversification of
candidate pools and appointments requires substantial effort and strategic thinking. This
transparency will allow outsiders to participate in those efforts and evaluate the results—to
credit the Fed’s successes and exercise accountability for the failures.
The article is organized as follows. Section II provides background on the Fed’s governance
and the changes that Congress and the Fed itself have made over the years to increase
director diversity. Section III, the bulk of the article, presents and describes the data we have
collected to describe the path of diversity at the Federal Reserve. In particular, we focus on
four elements of that diversity from our database: race, gender, occupation, and education.
The first two have received most of the attention in recent discussions; the last two much
less so. Section IV offers a more fully developed program for reform. Section V concludes by
emphasizing the importance of having an understanding of who the directors are. Two
appendixes present more data on race and gender, disaggregated by Federal Reserve Bank.

II.

The Governance of the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve System is a governance curiosity. The “federal” in its name is something
of a misnomer. There is no state-national balance in the system, no shared system of
sovereignty, but instead a balance among Fed regions—12 Federal Reserve Districts that
were designed at inception largely by Democratic politicians in a somewhat partisan
exercise that often bisected specific states—and the Washington, DC–based Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (Binder and Spindel 2016; Binder and Spindel 2017). The Board was
initially chaired by the secretary of the Treasury and included other presidential
appointments that required Senate confirmation, for political accountability purposes. The
Reserve Banks, one for each Federal Reserve District, would have a president (earlier styled
a “governor”), appointed by its directors (Conti-Brown 2016). Congress divided those
directors into three classes: Class A directors would be “chosen by and be representative of
the stock-holding banks,” those banks that joined the Federal Reserve System. Class B
directors would be “actively engaged in their district in commerce, agriculture, or some other
industrial pursuit,” and would be elected by stock-holding banks in the same manner as Class
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A directors. And, finally, Class C directors would be “designated by the Federal Reserve
Board,” at least two of whom would be individuals of “tested banking experience” but could
not be an employee of a stockholder bank (US Congress 1913).
The purpose of this intricate arrangement was in the spirit of checks and balances: some in
the original enacting coalition wanted a Federal Reserve Board for political accountability,
others wanted to ensure private Federal Reserve Banks to ensure that that accountability
did not turn the enterprise into a purely partisan one (Kolko 1965; Lowenstein 2015; Wiebe
1967). In 1935, the Federal Reserve System was reorganized into the modern version with
a Board of Governors in Washington, DC, and a Federal Open Market Committee that consists
of both Fed governors and Reserve Bank presidents. The structure of the Reserve Bank
directors remained the same (Conti-Brown 2016).
Congress has updated this somewhat byzantine governance framework with respect to Fed
directors at various important points during the Fed’s century. Two changes are especially
important. First, in 1977, Congress updated FRA Section 4 to include an antidiscrimination
provision for each class of directors. These directors were thenceforth to be selected
“without discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin.”6 The Class
B and C directors were to “represent the public” and were also to be selected “with due but
not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services,
labor, and consumers.”7 As in 1913, the banks still elect both Class A and Class B directors
and the Board of Governors appoints the Class C directors.
The other major change, one of director responsibility rather than director selection, came
in 2010 as part of Dodd–Frank. After 2010, the president and first vice president of the
Federal Reserve Banks were no longer to be selected by vote of the full board of directors,
but “shall be appointed by the Class B and Class C directors of the bank [the nonbanker
directors], with the approval of the Board of Governors.” The role of the Class A directors,
the bankers, in participating in the presidential search remains uncertain but not legally
forbidden (Fed Board n.d.2).8
Beyond these statutory parameters, the other formal law governing the appointments
process for Federal Reserve directors is about the voting process. There is little formal law
governing who can be appointed, although the Fed does publish a document outlining the
“roles and responsibilities of Federal Reserve Directors” that adds some gloss to the statute
(see Fed Board n.d.1 for the latest version).
Most importantly, there is no mechanism to ensure diversity along any parameter beyond a
prohibition against discrimination (with no enforcement or information-gathering
mechanism) and the relatively weak endorsement of “due but not exclusive consideration”
for various constituencies beyond banking.

12 USC § 302.
12 USC § 302.
8 12 USC 341, 124 Stat. 2126.
6
7
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Evaluating the Fed’s Diversity

In June 2020, during a regular FOMC press conference that coincided with rising protests in
response to the murder of George Floyd (among other events), Fed Chair Jerome Powell
confronted the problems of racism and the opportunities for diversity directly. “I speak for
my colleagues throughout the Federal Reserve System when I say that there is no place at
the Federal Reserve for racism.” He added: “These principles [of nondiscrimination] guide
us in all we do, from monetary policy to our focus on diversity and inclusion in our
workplace, and to our work to ensure fair access to credit across the country” (Powell
2020a).
Powell and his colleagues have continued to emphasize these issues, including within the
Federal Reserve System itself. Shortly before the following FOMC press conference, a former
Board staff economist published a blistering public letter that demonstrated poor diversity
performance in the economics field broadly and at the Fed specifically (Sahm 2020). When
asked about the letter, Powell further acknowledged, “there’s been a lot of pain and injustice
and unfair treatment that women have experienced in the workplace—not just among
economists, but among economists at the Fed . . . the Fed could have done more and should
have done more” (Powell 2020b).
Powell isn’t the lone voice from within the Fed calling for the institution to do better. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco President Mary Daly has spoken movingly and personally
about the gender discrimination she has faced as a junior employee of the Federal Reserve
System (see Daly 2018). Raphael Bostic, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
the first—and until 2022, only—Black Fed president, has recently given three speeches
focusing on the importance of diversity at the Fed and in the broader economy (see Bostic
2020a; Bostic 2020b; Bostic 2021). Scholars have also started focusing more on failures of
diversity within the financial regulatory community, including important studies published
by Brookings by Aaron Klein, Chris Brummer, and David Wessel (Brummer 2020; Klein
2016; Wessel, Sheiner, and Ng 2019).
As important as these conversations are, key mechanisms for improving diversity within the
system remain in the hands of these Reserve Bank directors. To understand better the
problem that Powell, Daly, Bostic, and many others have identified, we must take a long view
to outline just how grave the problem is that the Fed is confronting.
A. Methodology
Using the 106 publicly available annual reports of the Board of Governors from 1914 through
2019, we compiled a database of all 2,607 individuals who have served in unique positions
as Federal Reserve Bank directors.9 The information on the annual reports includes only
Annual reports are available on FRASER (n.d.). Our database includes 1,957 unique people. For our analysis,
we used the 2,607 count, which includes each time an individual served in multiple positions on the board of
directors. For example, if an individual was first elected a Class B director and was later appointed the board
chair (a Class C position) by the Board of Governors, we count this person twice. We believe this is a more
appropriate count because it includes every time a new position on the board of directors was filled. Note too
9

6

Diversity and Governance

Nygaard and Conti-Brown

district, city/state, employer, and board leadership position. From board position, we were
able to garner two pieces of information.
Beyond the information available on the annual reports, we expanded the biographical
database to include: race, gender, profession, education, age, time spent in position, and
whether or not the director later held a position on the FOMC. With help from exceptional
research assistants, we reviewed historical materials to catalogue this additional
biographical information. Our primary sources include: newspaper archives, census records,
genealogical databases, and corporate profiles.
We were able to find information on the diversity measures listed above for the following
proportions of directors in the database: a white/nonwhite race indicator for 97.5% of the
directors, a male/female gender indicator for 100% of the directors, the sector of 100% of
the directors, and the terminal degree for 72% of the directors.10
Categorizing people based on perceived race is a more fraught exercise, as a binary
white/nonwhite determination oversimplifies reality, particularly within the
Latino/Hispanic community.11 To overcome these limitations, we prioritized information
and sources as follows: (1) self-identification in a primary source, (2) identification in a
secondary source, (3) national origin/heritage in primary or secondary sources, where, for
example, all Latino/Hispanic countries from the Western hemisphere counted as nonwhite,
and (4) subjective determinations based on director photographs. The last and admittedly
least objective category constituted less than 10% of the nonwhite directors we recorded.
We do not include political affiliation, another important measure of diversity, in our
analysis. However, Caitlin Ainsley, a political scientist from the University of Washington, has
conducted a review of political campaign donations from the Reserve Bank directors
between 1980 and 2015, cataloguing donations from 71% of the directors. Ainsley’s study
suggests that along this important dimension, there is substantial heterogeneity among the
directors, a heterogeneity that is less apparent than in the areas we assess (Ainsley 2020).
Research by Gabrielle Elul finds that, “relative to the population of campaign contributors,
Reserve Bank directors make more donations, are more likely to donate to Republicans, and
are more politically conservative” (Elul 2018). These results suggest that the challenges to
diversify the directors, while very real, are not insurmountable: whatever process is
currently in place yields variety at least along this one dimension, suggesting a path ahead
along others, too.

that this only includes directors who were in their position at the time the annual report was compiled.
Therefore, some directors who started and ended their service between the compilation of two annual reports
are not included in this analysis. Whitney M. Young, Jr., the first Black director, is one such individual not
included in the database. See New York Times (1971), reporting on his tragic death.
10 Defined as the final degree they received, unless they received both a JD and PhD, in which case both are
catalogued.
11 For a history of the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” and their use in the US, see Martinez and Gonzalez (2020).
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B. Race
Figure 1 represents the history of the Federal Reserve System and records the number of
nonwhite directors from its founding in 1913 through 2019.12
Figure 1: Portion of Directors That Are Nonwhite (by Class)

Source: Authors’ analysis.

We do not observe a trend of inclusion of nonwhite directors until into the 1980s, and even
then, the inclusion of racially diverse directors is mostly a function of the Class C directors,
the nonbankers appointed by the Board of Governors. The Class B directors, nonbankers
appointed by member banks, began to see greater racial diversification in the 1990s. Most
worrisome is the lack of diversity among Class A directors, bankers appointed by bankers.
Not only has this number of nonwhite directors never been large, but it has also actually
decreased recently.
There is an obvious explanation for this failure of Class A racial diversity. The racial
homogenization is consistent with the known lack of gender and racial diversity in the US
banking industry more broadly. In February 2020, the US House Financial Services
Committee published a review of diversity based on a survey of the 44 largest banks in the
country (House 2020). The report indicates that while diversity in the industry has increased
at the entry and middle levels, executives and other senior leaders remain overwhelmingly
white. It is thus credible that the Fed’s diversity problem for Class A directors remains closely
tethered to the diversity problems for banking in general.
We can observe more differences when we break out racial diversity by Federal Reserve
Bank. Figure 2 represents the first year that each Federal Reserve Bank appointed its first
12 Nygaard

first discussed preliminary analysis of racial disparities among the directors of the Federal Reserve
Banks via Twitter based on an early version of the biographical database (Nygaard 2020a).
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nonwhite director, beginning in 1972 (Philadelphia and San Francisco) and ending in 1992
(Kansas City).
Figure 2: First Year with Nonwhite Director

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Appendix A goes further to break down the inclusion of nonwhite directors by each of the
Federal Reserve Banks. The numbers are not promising: there are significant periods for
each of the Federal Reserve Banks when there are not more than one or two nonwhite
directors at a time. Only Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco have had three or more nonwhite
directors on any sustained basis. It appears suggestive at least that the 1977 law prohibiting
discrimination had little effect in changing the racial composition of these boards.
C. Gender
The (lack of) gender diversity within the Fed’s boards of directors reflects a similar
homogenization as we see in racial diversity, as the first female directors are (1) nonbankers
and (2) appointed in the 1970s, followed in the 1980s by the election of the first few female
bankers. However, efforts to increase female representation have been far more successful
than has been the case for improving racial diversity. Female directors represented 37% of
all directors in 2019, across all classes (though the numbers are still better for nonbankers).
Figure 3 represents the Fed’s history with female directors across all districts.
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Figure 3: Portion of Directors That Are Female (by Class)

Source: Authors’ analysis.

To put this in context, the increase in the full US female labor force participation rate can be
seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Female Labor Force Participation

Source: BLS n.d.

Figure 5 represents the first year that female directors were appointed, from 1977 (Dallas,
San Francisco, St. Louis, Atlanta, and Philadelphia) to 1988 (Cleveland).
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Figure 5: First Year with a Female Director

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Appendix B provides district-by-district analysis of female director participation. The
Reserve Bank boards are, in general, not close to gender parity, with the important
exceptions of the Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis and Minneapolis, each of which had five
female directors in 2019. Some districts remain far from parity; only two of the nine
directors on each of the Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco boards are female. Here,
differently from the experience of racial diversity at the boards, our evidence is at least
consistent with the view that the 1977 law had an impact—perhaps even a major impact—
on the increase in gender diversity.
Similar to racial diversity, it is the case that finance in general has a problem, especially at
the senior level, for gender parity. The Fed is not alone in this regard. At the largest 44
financial institutions, according to the February 2020 US House Financial Services
Committee report, only 29% of senior executives are female. What is remarkable here is that
the Class B and C directors are explicitly not expected to be drawn from finance. Even so, for
the most part, the Fed struggles in this regard and has done so for most of its history.
D. Sectoral Representation
We turn now to sectoral representativeness among the directors. Figure 6 illustrates the
trends over time for the top 10 sectors.

11

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Figure 6: Top 10 Sectors over Time

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Given that Class A directors are explicitly bankers elected by bankers, it is perhaps
unsurprising to see their predominance. But a trend since roughly 1980 includes a
substantial and growing number of nonbanking finance representatives as the third-most
represented single group, after banking and manufacturing. The influence of finance on the
Reserve Banks’ governance remains very strong, even among the classes of directors meant
to represent other interests.
This overrepresentation of finance might arise from the rise of financialization of the US
economy during the same period by multiple factors.13 But it also represents a challenge to
the idea that the Reserve Bank boards should represent a variety of sectors in the economy.
The growth of nonbank finance represents a challenge to that conception.
Missing almost entirely from this equation, despite its inclusion in the list of statutory
considerations, is labor. Figure 7 illustrates the absence of labor participation in Fed
governance.

Financialization has many definitions, and scholars have used different methods for measuring it over time.
For a summary and review, see the introduction to Epstein (2005).
13
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Figure 7: Portion of Directors with Labor Background

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Figure 8 puts this data differently, outlining labor participation by each Federal Reserve
Bank.

13

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Figure 8: Total Number of Directors from Labor

Source: Authors’ analysis.

It is of course the case that organized labor is not the exclusive representative of working
women and men, so this lack of union representation may not apprehend the nature of labor
participation. Indeed, there is a long-term, well-documented secular decline in labor
representation, especially in the private sector. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has tracked
union membership in the US since 1980, and the percent of public sector union membership
has only dipped from slightly above 35% to slightly below it. The decline in private sector
union membership, on the other hand, has decreased steadily from nearly 17% in the 1980s
to 6% in 2020 (see USA Facts 2020). But even taking the general private sector decline in
union membership into consideration, it is remarkable how minimal labor participation is in
Federal Reserve governance, with few exceptions.14
E. Education
Given the importance of personnel selection—for the president of the Federal Reserve Banks
in particular but other Reserve Bank employees too—we analyzed educational attainment
for the directors. Although such attainment is not a prerequisite for evaluating personnel
quality that requires advanced education, it is relevant to that assessment. Figure 9 tracks
terminal degrees over time.

Nygaard has advocated for the US president and Senate to pay much more attention to labor representation
at the Board of Governors (Nygaard 2020b). We both endorse this conclusion.
14

14

Diversity and Governance

Nygaard and Conti-Brown

Figure 9: Terminal Degree (All Districts, Count)

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Note important gaps in our data—the further back we go, the less concrete the information.
(Also, note that we use the JD degree as a substitute for the LLB, which did not become
standard until the late 1960s.)
Notable here is the relative lack of participation on the boards of directors from academic
economists, a reversal of a trend for the heads of the Reserve Banks themselves, where a
majority of newly appointed Reserve Bank presidents since the 1980s have had a PhD, 80%
in economics.15 The Reserve Bank boards of directors therefore may be the one place where
economists are underrepresented relative to their importance to Fed governance.
This lack of representation for economists poses something of a governance quandary for
the Reserve Banks and their directors. If the directors’ primary responsibility is to select the
presidents of their banks, and the trend for central bankers is increasingly toward
sophistication in graduate level economics, is it plausible for these directors—the
overwhelming majority of whom do not have this training—to assess the merits of these
candidates? We posit the question but cannot answer it in this report. Suffice it to say that
this mismatch raises more questions than this one about the suitability of the present
governance arrangements.

Based on another biographical created by Nygaard based off FOMC participant biographies on the Fed’s
history website (Nygaard 2021).
15
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Figure 10 describes the area of academic focus for the directors.
Figure 10: Terminal Degree Major/Field (All Districts, Count)

Source: Authors’ analysis.

These trends are consistent with the professionalization of private and public bureaucracy
generally over the 20th century. Also, given the deep pockets of uncertainty, not much can
be drawn about these differences on the basis of this data alone. They do invite further
research, however, especially given, again, the relative dearth of economics as a field of study
for these directors.

IV.

Implications and Reform

Janet Yellen, current Treasury secretary and former Fed chair, explained why the lack of
diversity in economics generally matters at a September 2019 Brookings conference. She
highlights the basic fairness of increasing diversity, the better performance of diverse teams,
and the “wasted talent” if institutions don’t increase diversity (Yellen 2019). Research by a
Richmond Fed economist published in 2017 suggests that it would take more than 30 years
to reach gender parity for Reserve Bank directors at the current pace (Jarque and Davis
2019). Given the relative homogeneity across history of the Reserve Bank directors, we
suggest four conclusions that are important to consider as the Fed seeks to solve this
problem at a faster pace than it has done to date.
First, the road ahead for diversifying along race and gender for the Reserve Bank directors
will be challenging if history is a guide. To be fair, this is not a problem for the Federal
Reserve alone, and nothing in this report supports that conclusion. We do not know how well
or poorly other central banks, other government bureaucracies, or other private institutions
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have done on these same parameters.16 But if the goal is even representation—meaning that
the corps of Fed directors maps even passingly the population that these directors are meant
to represent—then there is a long way to go. That said, recent progress for Class C directors
suggests that this is a problem well within the Fed’s expertise to resolve. As of 2021,
minorities represented 56% of Class C directors, up from 22% in 2015.
Second, it is very difficult to believe that “due . . . consideration” has been given to labor in
the selection of Class B and C directors, despite that statutory instruction. The participation
of individuals with backgrounds in labor is a very small proportion of the entire corps of
directors, and even then, it is a recent phenomenon focused in some districts but not others.
This failure is even more striking given the Fed’s 2020 prioritization of its full employment
mandate over its inflation mandate.17
Third, given the nature of the task for Reserve Bank directors—that is, the selection of central
bankers who will make monetary policy—it is stark how little educational background in
economics we observe, even in recent years where our data is more complete. Although
economists are potentially overrepresented in the highest reaches of the Fed (and in other
central banks), they appear significantly underrepresented as participants in Fed
governance.
Fourth, director diversity is important for its own sake but also for the ways that that
diversity will influence the roles that these directors play in shaping the agendas of the
Reserve Banks, the Federal Open Market Committee, the general discourse around central
banking in the United States and beyond, and even supervisory priorities. Research by
Feinstein, Conti-Brown, and Nygaard finds that higher levels of diversity on Reserve Bank
boards correlate with higher Community Reinvestment Act scores, a measure of lending to
minority communities (2022). There are curiosities in the data, to be sure: The Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland is the first Reserve Bank with a female president, the last with a
female director. Diversity at the level of the directors will not solve, without more initiatives,
diversity issues elsewhere in the system. But it will be an important start, providing lessons
learned that will inform the processes throughout the system.
The Fed has already made public commitments to improving its challenges with diversity.
We applaud those efforts. But to rectify a history as homogenous as this requires something
more, especially given the byzantine governance structure and the limits that that structure
imposes on centralized decision-making.

Though not within the scope of this paper, two resources worth mentioning here are: (1) a report by the
Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum’s Sustainable Policy Institute on gender diversity that
includes analysis of gender in senior leadership at 156 central banks around the world, including the 12 Federal
Reserve Banks reviewed separately (SPI 2021); and (2) a Brookings report by Chris Brummer on the lack of
diversity among US financial regulators (Brummer 2020).
17 See Brookings’ Stephanie Aaronson for this broadly accepted interpretation of the Fed’s new flexible average
inflation target (Aaronson 2020).
16
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We therefore make the following three recommendations, in order of ease of
implementation.
(1) The Fed’s Board of Governors should make public the processes used to select Class
C directors, including opening up that process for application and the publication of
statistics regarding various aspects of such applications.
(2) The Federal Reserve Banks should, together, implement “best practices” for the
selection of Class A and B directors such that the member banks that elect those
directors can be guided by better processes.
(3) Congress should consider discarding the boards entirely and permit a more
accountable mechanism for Fed governance that puts governance more squarely in
the hands of political actors who can explain, defend, and answer for the successes
and failures of those mechanisms.

V.

Conclusion

The Federal Reserve System has never been the model of clear governance. But even short
of a dramatic overhaul, it can become better. Indeed, just one year after he became the first
Black governor of the Federal Reserve in 1966, Andrew Brimmer commissioned an internal
report on the Reserve Bank directors, concluding that the Fed “should have a better
understanding of the characteristics of this group of public servants” (Brimmer 1972). This
is as true today as it was 55 years ago. Our report’s biographical database and the analysis
we have conducted herein serves as an answer, a half-century later, to Brimmer’s charge.
If past is prologue, the future for Fed diversity at this important level is bleak. Fortunately,
there is great hope that the past will in this case remain in the past. Directors in each class
essentially all serve for a limit of six years. In relatively short order, then, each of the 12
Reserve Bank boards of directors can be remade. This means progress can be made quickly,
if prioritized. It is our hope that the data and recommendations in this report will facilitate
that transformation.

18

Diversity and Governance

VI.

Nygaard and Conti-Brown

References

Aaronson, Stephanie. 2020. “A More Inclusive Employment Mandate.” Brookings Institution,
Up Front, August 28, 2020.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/08/28/a-more-inclusive-employmentmandate/
Ainsley, Caitlin. 2020. “Decentralized Central Banks: Political Ideology and the Federal
Reserve System of Regional banks.” Governance 34, no. 2: 277–94.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/gove.12487
Binder, Sarah, and Mark Spindel. 2016. “Independence and Accountability: Congress and the
Fed in a Polarized Era.” Brookings Institution Center for Effective Public Management, April
2016.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Monetary-politics.pdf
———. 2017. The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs the Federal Reserve.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bostic, Raphael. 2020a. “Using Finance to Create Racial Equity: A Call for Change.” Keynote
speech delivered at the Conference on Racial Justice and Finance (virtual), Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta and Princeton University’s Bendheim Center for Finance, September 18,
2020.
https://www.atlantafed.org/news/speeches/2020/09/18/bostic-using-finance-to-createracial-equity.aspx
———. 2020b. “The Benefits of a Diverse and Inclusive Recovery.” Speech delivered at the
Annual Meeting of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (virtual),
October 19, 2020.
https://www.atlantafed.org/news/speeches/2020/10/19/bostic-benefits-of-a-diverseand-inclusive-recovery.aspx
———. 2021. “Measuring the Economy in the Time of COVID.” Speech delivered at the
Economic Club of New York, March 25, 2021.
https://www.atlantafed.org/news/speeches/2021/03/25/bostic-measuring-theeconomy-in-the-time-of-covid.aspx
Brimmer, Andrew. 1972. “Characteristics of Federal Reserve Bank Directors.” Federal
Reserve Bulletin 58, no. 6 (June): 550–59.
Brummer, Chris. 2020. “What Do the Data Reveal about (the Absence of Black) Financial
Regulators?” Brookings Institution Working Paper, September 2, 2020.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-do-the-data-reveal-about-the-absence-ofblack-financial-regulators/

19

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). n.d. “Labor Force Participation Rate - Women
[LNS11300002].” FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed December 4, 2021.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300002
Census Bureau (CB). 2020. “QuickFacts, United States.” Accessed December 8, 2021.
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI825219#RHI825219
Conti-Brown, Peter. 2016. The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
———. 2020. “Restoring the Promise of Federal Reserve Governance.” George Mason
University, Mercatus Center Working Paper, January 3, 2020.
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/monetary-policy/restoring-promise-fedgovernance
Conti-Brown, Peter, Yair Listokin, and Nicholas R. Parrillo. 2021. “Towards an
Administrative Law of Central Banking.” Yale Journal on Regulation 38, no. 1.
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol38/iss1/1/
Corser, Maggie. 2019. “The Urgent Need for a More Publicly Representative Fed: 2019
Diversity Analysis of Federal Reserve Bank Directors.” Fed Up and The Center for Popular
Democracy, February 2019.
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/FedUp-Diversity-DataBrief_2019_web.pdf
———. 2021. “Unrepresentative and Unaccountable: 2021 Analysis of Diversity in Federal
Reserve Leadership.” Fed Up and The Center for Popular Democracy, June 2021.
https://www.populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/20210709%20FedUp%20Diversity.pdf
Daly, Mary C. 2018. “Getting from Diversity to Inclusion in Economics.” Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, Economic Letter No. 2018–15, June 4, 2018.
https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economicletter/2018/june/getting-from-diversity-to-inclusion-in-economics/
Elul, Gabrielle. 2018. “A Seat at the Table: The Federal Reserve Banks and the Politics of
Governance.” PhD Dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.
Epstein, Gerald, ed. 2005. Financialization and the World Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/programs/globalization/financialization/chapter1.
pdf
Federal Reserve, Board of Governors of the (Fed Board). n.d.1. “Roles and Responsibilities of
Federal Reserve Directors.”
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/pdf/roles_responsibilities_finalw
eb013013.pdf

20

Diversity and Governance

Nygaard and Conti-Brown

———. n.d.2. “Directors—Appointment of Reserve Bank Presidents and First Vice
Presidents.”
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/PDF/appointment-of-reservebank-presidents-first-vice-presidents.pdf
Feinstein, Brian, Peter Conti-Brown, and Kaleb Nygaard. 2022. “Board Diversity Matters: An
Empirical Assessment of Community Lending at Federal Reserve-Regulated Banks.” Working
Paper. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. March 8, 2022.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/03/08/board-diversity-matters-an-empiricalassessment-of-community-lending-at-federal-reserve-regulated-banks/
FRASER. n.d. “Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1914–
2020.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/annual-report-board-governors-federal-reserve-system117?browse=1970s
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2011. “Federal Reserve Bank Governance:
Opportunities Exist to Broaden Director Recruitment Efforts and Increase Transparency.”
Report to Congressional Addressees, GAO-12-18, October 2011.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-18.pdf
Haedtler, Jordan, Andrew Levin, and Valerie Wilson. 2016. “Making the Federal Reserve Fully
Public: Why and How.” Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2016.
https://www.epi.org/publication/making-the-federal-reserve-fully-public-why-and-how/
House of Representatives, United States (House). 2020. “Diversity and Inclusion: Holding
America’s Large Banks Accountable.” Report prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee
on Financial Services, 116th Congress, Second Session, February 2020.
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA13/20200212/110498/HHRG-116-BA1320200212-SD003-U1.pdf
Jarque, Arantxa, and Caroline Davis. 2019. “Gender Composition of the Boards of Directors
of the Regional Federal Reserve Banks.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economics
Quarterly 105, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter): 201–50.
https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2019/q4/jarque.pdf
Klein, Aaron. 2016. “The Fed’s Striking Lack of Diversity and Why It Matters.” Brookings
Institution Op-Ed, August 1, 2016.
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-feds-striking-lack-of-diversity-and-why-itmatters/
Klein, Aaron, and Olivia V. Weiss. 2015. “Reform the Fed? Get Rid of Groupthink.” Bipartisan
Policy Center, April 7, 2015.
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/reform-the-fed-get-rid-of-groupthink/

21

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Kolko, Gabriel. 1965. Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Lowenstein, Roger. 2015. America’s Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve.
New York: Penguin Publishing Group.
Martinez, Daniel E., and Kelsey E. Gonzalez. 2021. “‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’? The
Sociodemographic Correlates of Panethnic Label Preferences among U.S. Latinos/Hispanics.”
Sociological Perspectives 64, no. 3. August 2021.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0731121420950371
New York Times. 1971. “Nixon to Attend Rites for Young: President Orders Air Force to Fly
the Body Home.” March 13, 1971.
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/03/13/archives/nixon-to-attend-rites-for-youngpresident-orders-air-force-to-fly.html
Nygaard, Kaleb. 2020a. “‘The Feds could have done more and probably should have done
more.’—Chair Powell.” Twitter, November 15, 2020, 5:57am.
https://twitter.com/KalebNygaard/status/1327928717008572417?s=20
———. 2020b. “Joe Biden Can Help remake the Federal Reserve So That It Actually Helps
America’s Workers.” Business Insider, December 12, 2020.
https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-appoint-federal-reserve-board-governor-laboramerican-working-families-2020-12
———. 2021. “FOMC Bio, 1914-Present.” Centralverse, Research Tools.
https://centralverse.org/FedWatcher/ResearchTools
Powell, Jerome. 2020a. “Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference, June 10, 2020.”
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20200610.pdf
———. 2020b. “Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference, July 29, 2020.” Federal
Reserve Board of Governors.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20200729.pdf
Sahm, Claudia. 2020. “Economics Is a Disgrace.” Macromom (blog), July 29, 2020.
http://macromomblog.com/2020/07/29/economics-is-a-disgrace/
Saraiva, Catarina, Steve Matthews, and Dave Merrill. 2020. “Fed’s Top Ranks Dominated by
White Men Despite Diversity Push.” Bloomberg, July 9, 2020.
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-federal-reserve-banks-diversity-hiring/
Sustainable Policy Institute (SPI). 2021. “OMFIF Gender Balance Index 2021.”
https://www.omfif.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GBI_2021-2.pdf

22

Diversity and Governance

Nygaard and Conti-Brown

United States Congress (US Congress). 1913. “Federal Reserve Act of 1913.” H.R. 7837, Public
Law Number 43. December 23, 1913.
USA Facts. 2021. “In 2020, the number of unionized workers dropped, while the share of
union members increased.” January 29, 2021. https://usafacts.org/articles/labor-unionmembership/
Wessel, David, Louise Sheiner, and Michael Ng. 2019. “Gender and Racial Diversity of Federal
Government Economists.” Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings,
September 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Diversity-report_updated3.pdf
Wiebe, Robert H. 1967. The Search for Order, 1877–1920. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
World Bank n.d. “Population, Female (% of Total Population) – United States.” Accessed
December 11, 2021.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=US
Yellen, Janet. 2019. “Former Fed Chair Janet Yellen on Gender and Racial Diversity of the
Federal Government’s Economists.” Remarks delivered at the Gender and Racial Diversity of
the Federal Government’s Economists event sponsored by the Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, September 24, 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/former-fed-chair-janet-yellen-on-gender-andracial-diversity-of-the-federal-governments-economists/

23

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

VII. Appendixes
Appendix A: Nonwhite Directors by Federal Reserve Bank
Figure 11: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Boston

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 12: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of New York

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Figure 13: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Philadelphia

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 14: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Cleveland

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 15: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Richmond

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 16: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Atlanta

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 17: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Chicago

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 18: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of St. Louis

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 19: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Minneapolis

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 20: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Kansas City

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 21: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Dallas

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 22: Nonwhite Directors from the Federal Reserve District of San Francisco

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Appendix B: Gender and Federal Reserve Bank Directors
Figure 23: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Boston

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 24: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of New York

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 25: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Philadelphia

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 26: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Cleveland

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 27: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Richmond

Source: Authors’ analysis.

39

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Figure 28: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Atlanta

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 29: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Chicago

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 30: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of St. Louis

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 31: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Minneapolis

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 32: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Kansas City

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 33: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of Dallas

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Figure 34: Female Directors from the Federal Reserve District of San Francisco

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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